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1. Introduction  
Malaysia is a fascinating case for studying financialization of everyday life (Lai, 2018; 
Langley, 2008a; Martin, 2002); national political and financial elites have a long history of 
promoting stock market activities to citizens as a solution for postcolonial socioeconomic 
challenges including nation building, and enhanced personal financial security. This process 
can be traced as far back as the 1970s, when the postcolonial New Economic Policy was 
introduced to address century-long inter-ethnic economic disparity, by using the stock market 
to selectively redistribute wealth from colonial power to (some) Malaysian citizens (Abdul 
Khalid, 2015). In the decades that followed, such efforts have become more pronounced, with 
policy goals aimed at transforming citizens into strong, reliable, self-acting and financialised 
actors (Hall, 2012; Langley, 2008a; Martin, 2002; Rudnyckyj, 2017), explicitly to assist in 
politically-inflected nation building objectives. This process, the development of a specific 
Malaysian financial citizenship (FC), is the focus of this article.  
FC refers to the efforts of elite actors including governments to render the financial 
system more inclusive to ordinary citizens (Leyshon and Thrift, 1995) and, as such, is a 
useful window through which to observe elite-citizen relations in financialization, which is 
the objective of this paper. To address this objective, we empirically analyse elite-citizen 
relationships in Malaysian FC development to understand how elements of the financial 
system have been used for complex postcolonial nation building efforts. Attempts by 




citizens’ everyday life. We contribute to the financialization literature by conceptualising 
financial citizens as actors who play a role in elites’ nation building strategies, rather than the 
subject of neoliberal policies encouraging citizens to leave their personal security to market 
devices (Lai, 2018; Martin, 2002). In doing so, we aim to provide a renewed focus on elite-
citizen relations in financialization within the broader context of economic geography, by 
highlighting the political aspirations of financialization and the behaviours of elites and 
citizens that help to make finance more important in everyday life. There are parallels here 
with Robert Aitken’s (2007) discussion of financial market investment for nation building in 
the US. However, our paper is distinctive in that it focuses on elites’ postcolonial nation 
building strategies, as a response to the complex consequences of colonial legacies, including 
interethnic tension and wealth inequality. In effect, colonialism created the social, political 
and economic conditions for a distinctive Malaysian form of financialised, postcolonial 
nation building. 
Specifically, this article has two key aims: first, the analysis of the Malaysian case is a 
response to a certain geographical lacuna in financialization studies (Christophers, 2012; 
French, Leyshon and Wainwright, 2011). Although critical work on financialization has 
recently expanded (Appleyard, Rowlingson and Gardner, 2016; Coppock, 2013; Hall, 2012; 
Lai, 2013; Pike and Pollard, 2010; Wainwright and Kibler, 2014), the field remains largely 
geographically anaemic (Christophers, 2012) due to the focus on Euro-American contexts. 
The focus on Malaysia provides not only a new case study, but also highlights the importance 
of history that pre-dates financialization as commonly understood in Euro-America. Doing 
this leads us to our second aim, which is to respond to the call for more postcolonial 
approaches in finance studies, especially in the economic geography literature (Pollard et al., 
2009). We draw on the definition of a postcolonial approach as a method to conduct research 




and seeing the world,” (Pollard and Samers, 2007, 324). Existing studies provide a good 
starting point in providing alternative perspectives for understanding how finance becomes 
more important in everyday life (Harker, 2017; Harker, Sayyad and Shebeitah, 2018; James, 
2014; Pollard and Samers, 2007). We also draw on feminist literatures that encourage 
observations of a wider variety of sites and procedures which produce economic practices in 
distinct and less partial ways (Bergeron, 2001; Elias and Roberts, 2016; Pimlott-Wilson and 
Hall, 2017; Pollard, 2013), for example, by observing citizens’ contribution to 
financialization as a response to formalised political aspirations on top of their own personal 
goals. 
The postcolonial approach highlights  a history of financialization in Malaysia which 
precedes the commonly known story of the phenomenon, for example, the rise of financial 
capitalism in Anglo-American from 1970s onwards (Krippner, 2005; Boyer, 2000). Instead, 
we focus on the way finance grows to become more important in everyday life as driven by 
politically-backed nation building strategies. Focusing on elite-citizen relations within a 
postcolonial approach allows us to observe legacies of colonial histories. Specific to Malaysia 
is the unequal distribution of power along ethnic lines which has resulted in interethnic 
wealth and income inequalities. This socioeconomic foundation leads to complex elite-citizen 
relations in FC and financialization, with elites attempting to resolve the socioeconomic 
issues as a key strategy for nation building, and in doing so, to gain political legitimacy. 
Taking on this postcolonial approach 
provides the timeframe for the analysis in the paper: our viewing of financialization is 
centred on the development of FC policies relating to equity markets from the postcolonial 
period (1950s onwards) in Malaysia. This considerably pre-dates the establishment of Islamic 
finance in Malaysia (Yakcop, 2002) and hence in this paper the primary focus is not Islamic 




current financial landscape (Elder, 2017; Lai and Samers, 2017; Müller, 2017; Rethel, 2016). 
However, the focus on equity market products to explore FC policies recognises a connection 
to Malaysian nation building narratives which includes but is not limited to Islamic finance 
products. In addition, the observation of citizens’ roles in FC development, expressed through 
their current financial practices, may include Islamic finance but the study is not designed to 
be limited to such products/activities.  
The findings in this paper are developed from data collected through in-depth, semi-
structured interviews with political and/or financial elites and with a group of citizens who 
are identified as being financialised through voluntary active engagement with stock market 
products. A complementary analysis of secondary data covering economic and social policy 
development in Malaysia is used to provide context and support the arguments. The focus on 
the stock market reflects the importance of this institution in Malaysia’s postcolonial 
development, especially in understanding elites’ aspiration in sustaining and strengthening 
their political legitimacy using a strategy of redistributing wealth between citizens. Through 
this background, we are able to observe Malaysia’s history of cultural tensions and income 
inequality as legacies of its colonial past. It is also through the stock market that we can 
observe how the realisation of elite aspirations are mediated by citizens’ practices that assists 
a specific form of FC development.   
The article is organised as follows: first, we conceptualise postcolonial FC, drawing 
upon literature on elites and individuals in financialization studies and identifying 
connections between financialization and the concept of FC. We also explain how FC will be 
viewed from a postcolonial angle by drawing on the histories of Malaysian colonisation and 
its nation building efforts. Second, the development of Malaysian FC from an elites’ 




views and actions. From this follows the argument that elites and citizen investors both play 
distinctive contingent roles in FC.  
 
2. Conceptualising Postcolonial Financial Citizenship  
2.1 Elites, Citizens, and Social Control  
Early works in critical finance were mainly focused on economies and systems, rather than 
individuals. In particular, the topic of financialization had emerged as a popular academic 
field that analyses the growth and spread of finance in contemporary capitalism and the 
society. Earlier literature on financialization focused on shifts in a capitalism increasingly 
characterized by finance-led growth rather than production-led growth (Aglietta, 1998; 
Arrighi, 1994; Boyer, 2000). Subsequent development has seen financialization taken up in 
multiple areas such as anthropology (Ho, 2009; Parkinson, 2014), geography (Coppock, 
2013; Pike and Pollard, 2010), sociology (Davis and Kim, 2015; Krippner, 2005), and 
political sciences (for example, a collection of articles in Epstein, 2005). Correspondingly, its 
focal subject has broadened from macro-economic patterns of capitalism, concerned with the 
accumulation of financial capital (Duménil and Lévy, 2005; Krippner, 2005) to giant 
corporations, focusing on modern corporations’ strategy to prioritise financial performances 
above all else (Aglietta, 2000; Froud et al., 2006; Lazonick and O’Sullivan, 2000), and to 
everyday life, observing the intrusion of finance within intimate spaces of 
individuals/households/citizens’ lives (Lai, 2017, 2018; Langley, 2008a; Martin, 2002; 
Wainwright and Kibler, 2014). 
We engage with this last set of literature on everyday life, which allows us to focus on 
saving and financial planning behaviours, and to critically analyse the way policy actions 
encourage individuals to seek what Lai (2018, 612) describes as “market solutions for 




in everyday life, one that is increasingly analogous to the technical operations of financial 
markets (Mandel, 1996), encouraged by policy promises that individuals can gain some sense 
of self-mastery, security and meaning through the financial management of their lives (Ertürk 
et al., 2007; Froud, Johal and Williams, 2002; Martin, 2002). Such policy promises 
accompany initiatives set in play by various groups of elites who could be identified as FC 
advocates; such actors promote the broadening and deepening of access to financial markets 
and skills for moderate-income citizens so that they become more responsible for their 
current, and more importantly future, welfare (Kear, 2013; Lai and Tan, 2015).  
The introduction of the concept of FC towards the end of Leyshon and Thrift’s (1995) 
article recognised a language intended to put pressure on financial systems to begin thinking 
about their exclusionary tendencies. Financial markets could be thought of having state-like 
boundaries, assigning them with responsibilities “which reach beyond consumer sovereignty 
into basic human rights” (336). For Leyshon and Thrift, as well as the authors who extended 
the literature on FC such as Dymski and Li (Dymski, 2005; Dymski & Li, 2003), FC is seen 
as representative of a dichotomous relationship of actors who are included versus actors who 
are excluded from the financial system. The concept of FC is useful as it explores efforts to 
expand financial inclusion by responsibilising states over their citizens’ ability to access the 
financial system effectively. Our paper extends the concept of FC as discussed by the authors 
above through understanding how complex elite-citizen relations can shape its development, 
implementation and outcomes. 
We first look at Kear’s criticism of the idealised view of FC development as ignoring 
the deeper political aspects of the financial system (Kear, 2013). For Kear, the popularity of 
FC amongst policy elites promises inclusivity while ignoring the deeply unequal system that 
makes up the spaces in which FC forms, given that the survival of finance itself is dependent 




useful in exploring whether the exclusion of certain actors is a deliberate or inadvertent 
consequence of policy design by elites, decisions by citizens or some other process. 
Analysing elite-citizen relations provides a way to explore these nuances, allowing us to 
examine the socio-political history that shapes these relations and consequently influences FC 
development. 
Earlier FC studies observe elite-citizen relations more normatively (Dymski and Li, 
2003; Leyshon and Thrift, 1995), closer to the Millsian theorisation of elites that 
conceptualise these group of actors as possessing economic and political power and authority 
that construct and influence social life (Mills, 1956). Similarly, these elites are understood to 
be influential in the way the financial system is organised and developed; they are thus 
responsibilised for FC development, with the aim that the financial system becomes more 
inclusive and more deeply embedded in society. Recent work on FC has challenged this view 
of elite-citizen dynamics. Lai and Tan (2015)’s study showed that elite-citizen relationships 
in FC could be geographically-contextual and political, as in the case of Singapore in which 
the government had expanded financial inclusion for citizens for the advancement of the 
country’s economy.  Lai and Tan’s work is more Foucauldian-inspired, observing power as 
omnipresent, ambiguous, complex, transversal, and multifaceted (Foucault, 1982, 1988, 
2012; Langley, 2008a; Martin, 2002); and thus adding agency to non-elite actors in 
influencing the processes of FC.  
We consider elite-citizen relations as an active (re)production of interactions. These 
interactions are complex, driven by specific localities and shaped by historical trajectories, 
cultural conventions, actors, events, and socioeconomic factors (Swyngedouw, 2004; Wolch 
and Dear, 2014). To provide a specific contextualisation of elite-citizen relations in Malaysia, 
we discuss the colonial histories of the country and how these impact on FC development 




2.2 Postcolonial Elites and Citizens  
In their contribution to a special issue of Theory, Culture & Society, Aeron Davis and Karel 
Williams (2017) argued that the difficulty in conceptualising elites when discussing 
financialization has much to do with the way financial hegemony has reshaped the spaces in 
which elite power is mobilised and reproduced. Through this lens, elite power is no longer 
simply about the privilege of wealth or class or the distribution of political power that has 
been inherited from such spaces (Mills, 1956). Instead, it is perhaps more suitable today to 
conceptualise elites by their "modus operandi", that is, "how they operate, rather than where 
they come from, the capital they have amassed, or the official position they occupy at a given 
time" (Wedel, 2017).  
Similar arguments to those of Wedel can be found amongst critical finance studies 
scholars with a more cultural stance, who have drawn on a Foucauldian approach in 
understanding elites and power (Hall, 2012; Langley, 2008b; Martin, 2009; Rudnyckyj, 
2017). In these studies, power has no longer been reduced to its attachment to privilege, 
wealth, or class; instead, it is omnipresent and multifaceted, produced and reproduced 
through agency that exists in the most intimate spaces, including everyday life. Taking a 
different emphasis, our conceptualisation of the elites-citizen relationship is expressed 
through analysing what elites and citizens do that results in the normalisation of finance in 
everyday life. This observation is focused on elite-citizen relations in postcolonial nation 
building which affects the way FC is operationalised and (re)distributed by elites to citizens 
and vice versa. Besides providing localised narratives of elite-citizens in FC (Lai and Tan, 
2015), our paper argues that the agency in elite-citizen relations is multidimensional and can 
be understood by observing the behaviours of both elites and citizens that are influential to 
FC. Although FC is operationalised through formal policymaking, the policies targeted at 




support the notion that citizens possess agency in FC development and financialization, 
although this agency is complex and conditioned by the way citizens relate to elites and their 
political aspirations. Before beginning the empirical analysis, we draw attention to the 
colonial histories of Malaysia, specifically during the period of the British Malaya colony.  
British Malaya refers to the period of British hegemonic control over Malaya, the nine 
Malay monarchies (ruling the geographies now known as peninsular Malaysia and 
Singapore) from late 18th until early 20th centuries. The most prominent legacy of the British 
colony over Malay[si]a is the segregation of ethnic groups based on economic functions, 
resulting in a pluralistic society comprising “two or more element or social orders which live 
side by side, yet without mingling, in one political unit” (Furnivall, 1939, 446). As argued by 
Furnivall, pluralism is often a result of colonialism: colonised governments are placed in 
subservient positions when constructing their newly-enfranchised countries, having had to 
accept legacy societal problems. The complication of this history is that popular nation 
building theories derived from Western scholars have been initially pessimistic on the 
prospects for the construction of a democratic society emerging from deeply plural histories. 
This pessimism originates from before the First World War; ethnic and racial horrors 
subsequently experienced in and around World War II cemented the negative perception that 
scholars have of deeply plural societies (Hefner, 2001).  
More recent development of Western theories of nation building has promoted more 
liberal views which call for the protection of individual citizens’ rights (Kymlicka and 
Norman, 1994)1; to the modernisation theory that encourages a homogenous political culture 
(ibid.); and finally, to a more secular and singular political authority in replacement of 
traditional, religious, familial, and/or ethnic-based polity (Huntington, 1968). The limitation 
                                                          





of these discussions is the persistent rarity of arguments about newly independent countries 
that are often forced and coerced to accept arrangements unfamiliar to their historical 
precedence, such as the case of postcolonial countries like Malay[si]a. 
Postcolonial countries’ nation building histories are often characterised by newly-
elected national governments, whose actors are selected based on their conformity to existing 
institutional (political, economic, financial) colonial arrangements (Hefner, 2001). More 
importantly, this conformity often occurs through coercion and/or pressure for the expedience 
of an independence agreement for their respective countries with colonist authorities (Jamil, 
Aminuzzaman and Haque, 2015). Post-independence, newly-elected governments would 
sometimes change and shape the institutional pillars of their countries to make sure that they 
are national and local, fine-tuning them to reflect domestic and contemporary needs, although 
the colonial foundations could remain the same.  
The absence of critical analyses of colonialism history in the literature on 
financialization results in an omission of the inorganic development of national customs and 
laws in colonised countries, and how these histories shape the way we understand the 
formation of financial markets either in these countries or globally (Christophers, 2012, 2015, 
2016; French, Leyshon and Wainwright, 2011; Pollard et al., 2009). Our observation of FC in 
Malaysia through a postcolonial reading helps us in politicising finance and elite-citizen 
relations in the broader context of financialization by focusing on elites’ efforts to use FC as 
part of nation building. Additionally, to demonstrate that elite-citizen relations in FC are 
multidimensional, we seek to explore experiences and behaviour of citizens because these are 
strategic and impactful to other ways of engaging with FC. This also allows a broader 





The empirical analysis in this article is based on field research conducted in the state of 
Selangor (including the federal territories of Kuala Lumpur and Putrajaya), Malaysia between 
August 2015 and December 2016. Selangor and its federal territories were chosen as a site for 
fieldwork as the average monthly household income figures in these locations (RM10900 or 
£2090 in 2016) are at least 1.3 times higher than the next highest state by monthly household 
income (Labuan at RM8174 or £1570 in 2016), and 2.6 times higher than the poorest state 
(Kelantan at RM4214 or £810 in 2016) (DoSM, 2017). Publicly available data on household 
disposable income does not provide the same granularity as data on household income. As 
such, we have made an assumption that due to the higher household income in Selangor and 
its federal territories, citizens there are more likely to have disposable income needed to 
invest in the stock market compared to other locations in Malaysia. 
The study uses a combination of document analysis, elite interviewing with thirteen 
high-ranking officials of various institutions (Table 1), and thirty semi-structured interviews 
with Malaysian citizens who are currently investing in the stock market (hereinafter “citizen 
investors”). The elites have been classified as political, financial and other, based on their 
formal roles and on the ways they approach FC development. Both political and financial 
elites work towards FC policymaking although their motives and aspirations can differ. For 
example, elites working for financial market institutions might observe FC development in a 
completely different manner to bureaucrats working in the Ministry of Finance or regulatory 
organisations. Similarly, elites who are not affiliated to FC policymaking (for example, in a 
financial services company) have different aims and understanding of FC development. 
Interviews were designed to capture these differences. 
Document analysis include formal national policies, official government and 
Malaysian private financial institutions’ statements and reports, as well as reports by global 





Table 1. List of Elite Interviewees 
Elites’ 
Positions 
Official Role (Indicator) Interview Date Status 
Political Former finance minister (#7) 17 December 2015 No longer active 
politically. In office 
in mid-2000s for one 
term. Currently 
acting as a 
technocratic elite. 
Former finance minister (#13) 5 April 2016 No longer active 
politically. In office 
for two terms, in the 
1980s and early 
2000s. Before and 
after his 
appointment, he 
continued to be a 
prominent business 
elite. 
Financial  Official at Regulator M, a 
financial market regulator (#1)  
5 August 2015  In office 
Official at Regulator M, a 
financial market regulator (#2) 
5 August 2015  In office 
Official at Market M (#3) 28 August 2015 In office 
Official at Market M (#4) 28 August 2015 In office 
Official at Economic Research 
Group K (#5) 
11 December 2015  In office 
Official at EPF1 (#6) 14 December 2015 In office 
Official at Malaysian Ministry of 
Finance (#8) 
23 December 2015 In office 
Official at Bank Negara 
Malaysia (#9) 





Official at Investment Bank H 
(#10) 
31 March 2016 In office 
Official at International Bank I 
(#11) 
31 March 2016 In office 
CEO of Wealth Management 
Firm C (#12) 
5 April 2016 In office 
1 Employees’ Provident Fund 
2 Non-political or -financial elites are elites who are not necessarily involved in the development of the financial 
system in Malaysia. However, their experiences and insights of the financial industry were useful for the 





For the first stage of interviews, elites, many of whom were recruited when one of the 
authors conducted an internship at the Ministry of Finance during the summer of 2015, were 
asked to discuss the motivations, issues, and outcomes of FC development. Information from 
this stage of findings were used to design the interviews with citizen investors. Snowballing 
took effect in the recruitment of both elite and citizen investors’ interviewees. The interviews 
were conducted in a mix of Malay and English and each lasted between 45-90 minutes. All 
the interviews were taped, transcribed, and translated (when needed). Although many elite 
interviewees had given permission to be quoted, we have decided to anonymise their 
identities to protect the identities of those other interviewees who wish to remain anonymous. 
All citizen investors’ identities have been anonymised as requested. The quotes used in the 
analysis are taken verbatim, whether from elite or citizen investor interviewees.  
 
3. Postcolonial Financial Citizenship in Malaysia: The Story of Elites 
The stock market is an ideal site to study financialization and FC development in Malaysia 
from a postcolonial perspective as its histories are deeply-rooted in the legacies of British 
colonisation of Malay[si]a. The formation of the Malay[si]an stock market had a specific 
colonial objective: to obtain rent from locally-extracted rubber and tin commodities which 
were then floated in the stock market with the purpose of transferring interests into the colony 
(Wong, 1988). The stock market was especially exclusive as it only allowed the floatation of 
British companies and had been useful for the British colony during the rubber boom of 1910 
and the subsequent increase of global dependence on tin mining (ibid.; Alatas, 2010). Both 
events resulted in the floatation of more (and mostly) British companies in the stock market. 
As such, the capital flows into and out of the stock market were integral to the maintenance 
of the British colony rather than Malay[si]a as a singular country, assisting them in holding 




The Malayan independence in 1957 and the formation of the Federation of Malaysia 
in 1963 had not shaken the dominant influence of the British over the Malay[si]an stock 
market (White, 2003). The newly-enfranchised government attempted to develop the stock 
market to spur credit financing for local pioneer companies (Jomo, 2003), although the 
British influence over the Malay[si]an economy was still strong (White, 2003). For example, 
six years after Malaya’s independence, the British held 75% of assets in Malay[si]an 
territories (ibid., 223) and by 1969, British (corporate) control was still evident with 
ownership of 62% of the share capital (by value) of limited companies in Malaysia (MEPU, 
1970, 40). The wealth inequalities along ethnic and colonial lines which had persisted for 
more than a decade after the country’s formation ignited a race riot in 1969. It was then that 
the first instance of a significant policy transformation was made to address the country’s 
socioeconomic disparities.  
The 1969 race riot can be traced to Malay[si]a’s extremely unequal society. The plural 
nature of Mala[si]an society created through British colonialism meant that the country’s 
three main ethnic groups, the Bumiputeras, the Chinese, and the Indians,2 were (loosely) 
separated as self-sufficient farmers, business owners, and estate producers respectively 
(Alatas, 2010). Such inter-ethnic division caused strong economic imbalances that were 
ignored by Malaysian political elites long after the country’s independence, resulting in 
significant inter-ethnic income, employment, and equity ownership disparity (Abdul Khalid, 
2015). The 1969 racial riot forced Malaysian political elites to consider these issues more 
                                                          
2
 The Bumiputeras, also known as sons of the soil are made up of the indigenous people known as orang asli 
and the Malays (Milner, 2010).The Bumiputeras made up the majority (nearly 70%) of the population during the 
British occupation. As for the second largest population in Malaya, the Chinese have been brought in by the 
British or have voluntarily immigrated for trading purposes from the Qing Dynasty, now known as the Republic 
of China. The third largest ethnic group is Indians, although this is a misguided ethnic/racial identification, as 
the migration of people from the Indian subcontinent to Malaya meant that a variety of ethnic groups from that 
region had initially came to Malaysia. The Malaysian Indian ethnic group was a legacy of the British colony 




seriously, in large parts for their political legitimacy, leading to the New Economic Policy in 
1970, aimed specifically at mobilising wealth to correct inter-ethnic economic disparity and 
poverty reduction as part of Malaysia’s nation building strategy (MEPU, 1970). 
The Policy first introduced financialization through FC as a project of and for citizens, 
but this was a process unlike those in Anglo-American countries which were driven by the 
transfer of financial responsibility from political elites and systems to citizens (Froud, Johal 
and Williams, 2002; Krippner, 2005, 2011; Langley, 2007). Instead, the Malaysian 
experience was a result of political elites of the then ruling party taking greater responsibility 
for citizens’ finances, in their effort to secure their political positions that had been 
challenged by the 1969 racial riots, create social cohesion and simultaneously build their 
nation, post-colonisation and post-independence. This first instance of financialising citizens 
occurred through the strategy of addressing inter-ethnic income disparity by mobilising the 
country’s wealth, which had previously been held mainly by colonial power through the 
equity ownership of important state institutions, as well as the Chinese ethnic group through 
their ownership of Malayan businesses, land, and plantations (Abdul Khalid, 2015; Alatas, 
2010). As part of this, the role of the stock market was redrawn politically so as to allow the 
creation of a new (parallel) source of wealth accessible to Malaysian citizens, especially to 
the Bumiputeras and its main Malay sub-group. The Malay sub-group comprised the majority 
ethnic group and was therefore the most important political voting influence in the country 
(Alatas, 2010; Gomez and Jomo, 1997). It is also the case that the Malays were the poorest 
ethnic group of citizens: 
“In terms of per capita income, the Malays received $34 per month or one-half that of the 
Chinese at $68, while the Indians obtained $57 or some 70% more than the Malays. Of all poor 




were in poverty compared to 26% for Chinese households. In the case of Indian and other households, 
39% and 45% had incomes below the poverty line.” (MEPU, 1975, 5) 
The Policy further introduced the concept of ownership-in-trust schemes in 1981, in 
which financial elites were entrusted by political elites to manage the mobilisation of wealth 
by offering sovereign investment schemes to citizens (Gomez and Jomo, 1997). More 
importantly in Malaysia’s case is the manner in which FC and its processes were 
implemented in a non-democratic manner. Rather, access to equity ownership among the 
mass public was exclusively given to the Bumiputeras, and as such problematised the equal 
inclusion rhetoric of FC development. Nonetheless, these initial efforts to expand access to 
financial markets in line with the rhetoric of FC created the first instance of mass investment 
in the stock market involving citizens, evident by the 170,000 Bumiputeras exercising the 
offer in its opening week (Bidin, 2009; Permodalan Nasional Berhad, 2015).3  
This initiative can be seen as part of a broader set of changes following the 
appointment of Mahathir Mohamad as Prime Minister (PM) in 1981 (hereinafter Dr. 
Mahathir – the rest of the article refers to personal names rather than patronym names, as it is 
a common Malaysian custom, even in formal context), which greatly changed the distribution 
of elite power, making it more fragmented. Dr. Mahathir’s main objective was to move 
Malaysia away from its colonised past by developing economic growth comparable to that of 
Western, developed countries (Mohamad, 1991). The strategy chosen was to kindle political-
business relationships, thus making the country’s governance increasingly neopatrimonial 
(Jesudason, 1989). We adopt Erdmann and Engel’s (2007) political science definition of 
neopatrimonialism as a hybrid institutional arrangement, in which the exercise of political 
power is erratic and unpredictable. Neopatrimonialism sees the combination of authoritarian 
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politics with personal and informal public norms, for example in the spaces of policymaking. 
In Malaysia’s case however, just as in the case of many of its neighbouring countries, 
authoritarian politics are masked under the ideology of democracy, where democratic 
procedures such as national elections are modified in order to increase the hegemony of a 
dominant, single-party government that assimilate with or marginalizes the opposition (Chua, 
2010). Malaysia’s neopatrimonialism had been evident in the appointment of business elites 
in political realms, such as Daim Zainuddin, a prominent financial mogul who acted as the 
finance minister from 1984 to 1991 (Wain, 2012)4. Under Daim’s and Dr. Mahathir’s 
direction, business elites assisted political and financial elites in nation building, with the 
latter group providing patronage to the former in a series of economic liberalism strategies 
that were drawn in the 1980s and implemented in the early 1990s (Jomo and Tan 2003; 
MEPU 1989; Mohamad 1992, 1991). 
The impact of these actions on FC development was significant. With liberalism, 
access to financial markets was widened to assist the country in achieving economic growth 
aligned with nation building strategies (Jomo, 2003; Sulong, 2014), the result of which 
included a twofold increase in domestic retail participation (citizens’ individual holdings) in 
the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange, from 24% in 1988 to 50% in 1993 (Jomo 2003, 123; 
Wong 1988, 88-89). However, the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, which wiped nearly all retail 
shareholders from the stock market (Kaplan and Rodrik, 2002), halted the progress of FC 
development. Furthermore, the introduction of capital controls (a direct contradiction of the 
IMF’s prescriptions) by Malaysian political elites after the crisis had largely impeded the 
country’s economic progress. This choice represented a complete reversal of the (neo)liberal 
stance taken in the early 1990s (Khoo, 2005), causing economic and political havoc that 
received worldwide criticism.  
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Such events did not deter Malaysian political and financial elites from revisiting the 
development of FC. After the Asian Financial Crisis, this program was resurrected in line 
with the multiple objective of nation building and transforming citizens into individualistic, 
self-acting individuals (former finance minister, #13, 5 April 2016). As part of this, certain 
financial institutions have played important roles:  Bursa Malaysia, the demutualised 
corporate entity of the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange;5 the Securities Commission, in charge 
of regulating and developing the Malaysian capital market; and Bank Negara (the central 
bank), the first institution to conduct extensive research on the implementation and 
dissemination of financial literacy education (FLE) among citizens.  
The development of FC after the Asian Financial Crisis was different from earlier 
citizenship efforts. Since the Crisis, financial elites have been assigned greater responsibility 
by political elites, especially Dr. Mahathir, to carry out reforms in the financial system. The 
two main official documents accompanying this move were the Financial Sector Masterplan 
and the Capital Market Masterplan, engineered by Bank Negara and the Securities 
Commission respectively (BNM, 2001; SCM, 2001). These documents presented a series of 
reform and development strategies for the financial system, which collectively demonstrated 
strengthened efforts to encourage the Malaysian economy and induce citizens to take greater 
control of their future using financial products such as stock market investment. However, 
this shift meant that citizens require a higher-level financial literacy to make more complex 
consumption choices, prompting the dissemination of what we term sophisticated FLE 
initiatives, that is, education that prepares citizens to be financially skilful beyond the basic 
concepts of saving and borrowing into the more entrepreneurial realm of investment, 
including those involving stock market participation.  
                                                          
5 To encourage the stock exchange to become more vigorous in playing their role in contributing to the 
government’s nation building aspirations, it was demutualised, turning it from a non-profit to a corporate entity 




Malaysia’s first, basic FLE initiative had begun as early as 1993, during a period 
when the country was influenced by economic liberalism while actively pursuing its nation 
building objectives. Bank Negara became the first active institution to promote FLE by 
incorporating it in schools’ curriculum in collaboration with the Ministry of Education (Koid, 
2010). Again, Malaysia was rather advanced in this effort because in many developing 
countries the growth of FLE policymaking started nearly a decade later, with transnational 
policy institutions such as the IMF, World Bank, and the Organisation for Economic Co-
Operation and Development (OECD) advocating its usefulness for the stability of domestic 
and global financial markets by transforming citizens into more informed financial 
consumers (Arthur, 2012; Dev, 2006; Greenspan, 2002; Williams, 2007).  
 While much of these basic FLE initiatives still exist today, post-2009 saw the 
development of an increasingly sophisticated FLE, promoted by financial elites (official at 
Regulator M, #2, 5 August 2015). These sophisticated FLE efforts include Bursa Malaysia’s 
stock market literacy programmes, aimed at developing “fundamentally-informed” investors, 
using technologies such as an educational website called BURSA MKT.PLC, investment 
workshops and competitions, university lectures and so on (officials at Market M, #3 and #4, 
28 August 2015). Bursa Malaysia also received public support from then incumbent PM 
Najib Razak, who, through his official Twitter account, congratulated the institution for one 
of their efforts while using the official slogan of the initiative. Similarly, the Securities 
Commission has its own sophisticated FLE initiative called the “Investment Empowerment 
Initiative,” which aimed at cultivating citizens who are not only informed investors, but also 
individuals who are responsible for their financial futures (official at Regulator M, #2, 5 
August 2015). This argument demonstrates the complexities in understanding elites involved 
in Malaysian FC development, given that the Securities Commission (the regulator) and 




different official roles. To further understand these nuances, elite interviewees were 
questioned about their motivations for sophisticated FLE. Many stated that they believed that 
providing citizens with the right financial skills could assist in transforming them into 
financially empowered, autonomous, independent, and responsible individuals. Political elites 
appeared to be motivated by a nation building agenda, in which (neo)liberal, financial 
citizens were envisioned to be empowered to take control of their personal financial goals, 
the behaviour of which could contribute to the growth of the country’s economy and political 
stability by minimising potential financial instabilities (officials at Regulator M, #1 and #2, 5 
August 2015; official at Ministry of Finance, #8, 23 December 2015; official at Bank Negara 
Malaysia, #9, 23 March 2016). On the other hand, financial elites appeared to be motivated 
by the vision of transforming citizens into financial entrepreneurs, that they should be able to 
adopt complex investment strategies such as portfolio management and diversification, and 
contribute to the deepening of financial markets (officials at Market M, #3 and #4, 28 August 
2015; official at Investment Bank H, #11, 31 March 2016; official at International Bank I, 
#12, 31 March 2016). 
  Some interviewees were, however, critical of the objectives of FC development, 
regardless of their political or financial positions. For example, two elite interviewees noted 
that encouraging citizens into complex financial arenas is risky, as citizens do not possess the 
same necessary skills or investment capital as financial professionals (official at Bank Negara 
Malaysia, #9, 23 March 2016; official at Wealth Management Firm C, #10, 28 March 2016). 
This suggests some recognition that their FC expectations are problematic in terms of both 
delivery and effects. 
  The ambition to resolve multiple goals is problematized by the absence of evidence 
to support a correlation between citizens’ participation in the stock market and economic 




Malaysia into a developed country have changed several times over the past three decades 
and contemporary policies remain confusing. On the one hand, Malaysia’s nation building 
objectives are promoted to citizens with the justification of societal advancement; the 
development of the country had always been promised as a political agenda to make citizens’ 
lives much better. This could be exemplified by original quotes from Vision 2020, a nation 
building strategy led by Dr. Mahathir in 1991 with the aim of transforming Malaysia into a 
developed country by 2020: 
“Malaysia should not be developed only in the economic sense. It must be a 
nation that is fully developed along all the dimensions: economically, 
politically, socially, spiritually, psychologically and culturally. We must be 
fully developed in terms of national unity and social cohesion, in terms of 
our economy, in terms of social justice, political stability, system of 
government, quality of life, social and spiritual values, nation pride and 
confidence.” (Mohamad, 1991) 
However, much of the strategy focusing on nation building is economic, with ambitious 
objectives based on economic indicators. For example, Dr. Mahathir’s Vision 2020 indicated a 
need for the Malaysian economy to sustain GDP growth “by an average of 7 per cent (in real 
terms) annually over the next 30 years,” (Mohamad 1991, 7). In 2010, Vision 2020 remained 
the backbone of Malaysia’s nation building approach, as evidenced by former PM Najib’s 
New Economic Model, a ten-year economic planning document constructed and implemented 
by Najib Razak’s Administration. The New Economic Model mentioned the need for 
Malaysia to reach “real growth rate of an average of 6.5% per annum over the 2011-2020 
period,” to achieve the goals of Vision 2020 (NEAC, 2010, 9). Within this, FC development is 
justified as supporting the betterment of citizens: the notion that financial empowerment of 




in its promotion (former finance minister, #13, 5 April 2016). However, such objectives were 
deemed problematic by one elite interviewee because it ignores citizens’ economic position: 
You’ll be surprised how many people still do not have access to formal 
financial institutions. Especially in certain pockets of origin, for example 
Kelantan,6 (access to formal financial institution) is still low. […] Why? 
There is a lack of income, of course! (Official at Economic Research Group 
K, #5, 11 December 2015, translated from Malay; words in brackets added 
for clarity; and emphasis added) 
When FC development includes nation building objectives for the purposes of political 
legitimacy, it ignores the awkward point that many Malaysian citizens are unable to 
participate in even the most basic of financial activities because of their low incomes: 
[It’s] premature. […] if you want them to participate [in the stock market], 
there must be savings. Now where is the savings coming from? Savings can 
only come if you have good income. (Former Malaysian finance minister, 
#13, 5 April 2016; translated from Malay with original emphasis. Words in 
brackets added for clarity.) 
Attempts to promote FC for nation building in the face of entrenched income inequality and, 
at the lower end, low absolute incomes could further deepen inequality and disunity, not only 
along inter-ethnic lines, as had been the case in the past (Malaysian economist, #5, 11 
December 2015), but also along inter-class and urban-rural divisions. In effect, FC policies 
have excluded low-income, rural citizens from many economic and financial opportunities 
regardless of how financially-informed and empowered they might be (official at EPF, #6, 14 
December 2015).  
To conclude this section, the story of political and financial elites’ involvement in FC 
development is complex, going beyond the simple justification of inclusion. The effort to 
                                                          




transform the financial system, or in this case specifically the stock market, into a democratic 
arena might not work by simply providing access and skills, when deeply-ingrained 
systematic income disparity that already existed in the country’s history is ignored. Some 
elite interviewees were clearly aware of these disadvantaged groups, effectively excluded by 
contemporary FC initiatives, yet this had not been an obstacle to the promulgation of the 
policies, even while it inevitably limited their effectiveness. The next section considers such 
initiatives from the perspective of citizen investors. 
4. Citizen Investors’ Perspective 
This section focuses on the analysis of interviews with citizen investors to explore the role 
they play in FC development. The demographic and investor characteristics of the citizen 
interviewees are summarised in Table 2.  
Table 2. Demography and Characteristics of Citizen Investors 
 Frequency Percent 
Ethnicity   
Bumiputera – Malays 28 93.4 
Chinese 1 3.3 
Indian 1 3.3 
 30 100.0 
   
Current experience investing in the stock market1   
Mostly investing directly 4 13.3 
Mostly investing indirectly 24 80.0 
No longer investing 2 6.7 
 30 100.0 
   
Experience in types of stock market investment channels   
Have invested in both stock market investment channels 





Have invested in only one type of stock market investment 
channels (directly OR indirectly) 
17 56.7 
 30 100.0 
   
Main influence   
Private investment classes 1 3.3 
Self-research 5 16.7 
Friends 7 23.3 
Family/spouse 5 16.7 
Licensed intermediaries 2 6.7 
Friends/family who are licensed intermediaries2 10 33.3 
 30 100.0 
1 Direct investment refers to the direct purchase and selling of stocks through a stock market platform while 
indirect investment refers to participation in the stock market through the purchase of unit trust schemes which 
are professionally managed. 
2 Licensed intermediaries are actors who play a formal role at intermediating investors with the stock market. 
Remisiers are the well-known term in Malaysia for licensed intermediaries in direct stock market selling and 
purchasing; while in the unit trust industry, they are recognised as unit trust consultants. 
 
Although interviews were focused on exploring citizen investors’ role in post-2009 
FC development, they also provided some context for the outcomes of earlier Malaysian 
elites’ FC policies. Out of the 30 interviewees, 28 had been Bumiputeras, specifically from 
the Malay sub-group, and it is notable that this is a group which historically has suffered from 
income and wealth inequalities. According to the Second Malaysia Plan (the second 5-year 
nation building plan released by the government since 1966) which contains the strategies of 
the New Economic Policy, as per 1970 “[o]f all Malay households, 65% were in poverty 
compared to 26% for Chinese households. In the case of Indian and other households, 39% 
and 45% had incomes below the poverty line,” (MEPU, 1970, 5). In terms of wealth, of the 
36.5% of Malaysian equity not held by British interests, there was a considerable gap of  
between the three main ethnic groups, with the Chinese holding 27.2% equity capital, 




In terms of citizen investors’ roles in the more contemporary, post-2009 FC 
development, the findings demonstrate that while they are actively engaging in the 
programme, they appeared reluctant to recognise the connection between their investment 
behaviours and elites’ initiatives. This was first observed through interview questions which 
focused on citizen investors’ awareness of FC initiatives and their willingness to voluntarily 
participate in these initiatives. To do this, interviewees were first given information on 
current FC initiatives that are more publicly aimed at citizens. These included Bursa 
MKTPLC (an educational website on stock market investment), Securities Commission’s 
InvestSMRT (an educational website on stock market investment), investment classes 
provided by the Securities Commission and Bursa, and investment classes provided by the 
Federation of Investment Managers Malaysia. Afterwards, they were also given information 
on past initiatives, such as the usage of licensed intermediaries and shariah (Islamic) 
investment. Then they had been asked if they had participated in the initiatives or had 
obtained information on these initiatives. 
 Half of those interviewed admitted to being aware of various current and/or past FC 
initiatives, although this awareness rarely came through formal channels. These investors 
relied mostly on friends and families rather than official advertisements or promotions. 
Additionally, only two citizen investors had participated in more contemporary, post-2009 
initiatives. Others cited lack of interest in formal initiatives or regarded them as unhelpful to 
their investment and/or financial management needs. When asked if they felt at any point that 
elites’ efforts could have influenced their decision to invest in the stock market, nearly 90% 
of interviewed citizen investors disagreed.  
Citizen investors were also asked if they saw their active engagement with stock 
market activities as an expression of their responsibility as Malaysian citizens, that is, do they 




building strategies? Only 13% of interviewees answered positively to this question, explicitly 
mentioning patriotism in their given answers: 
Yes. I mean… it’s nothing. That thing is something that is embedded. When 
I’m doing certain things, I’m always thinking about the benefit of the 
government—. No, the benefit of the nation. (Citizen Investor #25, 23 
November 2016, some words translated from Malay, original emphasis) 
Always, always! It always crosses my mind because everything has an effect 
and a cause. Investing is about cause and effect. The reason I invest is of 
course for financial and profitable security. Objective is to have financial 
security in the future and also to have gains in terms of my capital. But 
indirectly, I’m also helping the company that I’m investing in. Because now 
they have extra resources to build and expand their business. And that itself 
creates jobs for the economy. (Citizen Investor #27, 25 December 2016) 
So far, I do want to help Malaysia too. I can’t be helping other country’s 
economies because this is my tanah air.7 Whatever happens, I live here, and 
this is my country. So, when I’m investing, I do look at whether the funds 
are related to Malaysia or not. (Citizen Investor #29, 23 December 2016, 
translated from Malay and emphasis added) 
The quotes above indicated that some citizen investors had considered the importance of 
nationalism and nation building when investing in the stock market. The quotes also illustrate 
that there are Malaysian citizens who invest in finances for reasons beyond their own 
individualistic economic benefits. 
                                                          
7 Translation: Tanah air could be understood as “country,” but a direct translation of the phrase is “soil and 





The majority of citizen investors interviewed, however, did not share this patriotic 
sentiment. More interesting, however, is that more than three-quarter of the interviewees not 
only expressed a lack of interest in supporting official nation building objectives, but several 
highlighted their unwillingness to help the country at all. These participants seemed to equate 
elites with government and country, suggesting that their hostility was more towards specific 
(political) elites rather than to Malaysia as a geographical entity. When asked to elaborate on 
their hostility, these citizen investors talked about recent political scandals and economic 
uncertainty, which have had a high profile in mass and social media in Malaysia (Vasagar, 
2016). Moreover, the global economic downturn and an increase in the cost of living have 
weakened citizens’ confidence in the incumbent Malaysian federal government during the 
time of the interviews.8 This statement could be supported by findings from the Edelman 
Trust Barometer Global Report (2018a) which showed that the average percentage of trust in 
the Malaysian government by Malaysian citizens have dropped significantly from 2013 
(59%) to 2017 (37%). This drop of trust had been linked to issues around allegations of 
corruption in the government and the mismanagement of government funds (Edelman, 
2018b).  
Many interviewees cited this tumultuous political and economic background as 
inciting fear and uncertainty, affecting their decision-making in relation to personal financial 
security. This was evident in the management of their mandatory retirement savings plan in 
the government-owned Employees’ Provident Fund (EPF). In Malaysia, private sector 
employees must participate in the retirement savings plan managed by the EPF. According to 
several citizen investors, their distrust of elites, especially those like the EPF which they view 
as part of government, had influenced their decision to move their employment savings in the 
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EPF into private unit trust schemes (unit trust funds are similar to mutual funds which are 
commonly found in the US or the UK, although their legal structure is slightly different):  
The real reason I invested in [private] unit trusts is because […] of the 
scandals and whatnot. I fear that if I were to leave all my money in my EPF, 
it would be dangerous. (Citizen Investor #28, 24 December 2016, word in 
brackets translated from Malay) 
The private unit trust scheme is a reference to an EPF’s private-fund-transfer scheme. The 
scheme is a collaborative effort by the institution with the Ministry of Finance and the private 
unit trust industry, which allows contributors (employees) to transfer a certain amount of their 
contribution to approved, private unit trust schemes (official at EPF, #6, 14 December 2015). 
Specifically, the scheme was developed to assist citizens in becoming more financially-
independent by encouraging them to invest their employment savings in private-based unit 
trust schemes to provide better returns. As such, this scheme appeared to fit the motivations of 
post-2009 FC development, in providing greater citizen access to financial products, and in 
doing so encouraging financial autonomy. The hostility of some citizen investors towards 
elites is complex given that schemes such as the EPF’s private-fund-transfer were organized 
by the same elites that citizen investors were sceptical about. This suggests that some citizens 
might be unaware of how they are reinforcing elites’ goals in FC development, despite 
adamantly wanting to resist formal elite initiatives.   
To overcome their distrust of (especially political) elites, the interviews suggest that 
citizen investors take greater responsibility for their personal financial security by actively 
thinking about their financial futures. For example, many of them mentioned that they can no 
longer rely on the EPF to provide a comfortable and financially-secure retirement. A few said 





I’m just thinking about myself. […] I think now the government is using our 
money to help themselves. […]  Actually I am afraid. How do I say this? I 
don’t know if when I’m 60, my money will actually be there or not. I don’t 
know if it’ll still exist because right now all I know is that the government is 
using the money for rolling whatever--. Debt that they’ve made. (Citizen 
Investor #9, 5 October 2016, translated from Malay) 
 
[About thinking of investments solely for personal benefits]: The financial 
markets are all corporate entities. They are out making--. Their only reason 
of existence is to make profits. And I’m helping them by investing in their 
companies. So I don’t--. It doesn’t seem like something patriotic or anything. 
I mean it’s just how the system works. (Citizen Investor #3, 26 September 
2016) 
 Interviews suggest that citizen investors are aware of the politically-inflected 
motivations behind FC and that their participation in such initiatives lends political legitimacy 
to political elites. Based on this, they are looking closer to their own networks to support their 
personal financial security management, partly in response to distrust of elites. Several 
interviewees indicated unwillingness to support elite nation building goals, given poor 
behaviour by political elites. Instead, interviewees mentioned proximate social actors—family 
members, friends, and/or colleagues—who have been influential and supportive in 
encouraging citizen investors’ financial actions. For example: 
 [I started investing] mostly through friends’ opinions. A lot of them did unit 
trusts on top of working. So they told me a lot about it, saying that it is good 
to invest for a couple of years. (Citizen Investor #5, 9 October 2016, 
translated from Malay). 
Citizen investors also mentioned the influence of licensed intermediaries—formal 




investors who claimed that they were influenced to invest by family members, friends or 
colleagues stated that those influencers are licensed intermediaries. Citizen investors’ 
answers demonstrate that their financial practices have been shaped by a sense of loyalty to 
their proximate social actors. They mentioned that they would usually select licensed 
intermediaries who were also related to them either via platonic or familial relationships, so 
that they could help them earn income in the form of brokerage fees or commissions (based 
on the number of new investors they attract into the stock market). It was apparent that 
supporting intermediaries in their social circle had been more important than engaging with 
formal FC initiatives. For example, Citizen Investor #9 who had been quoted above as feeling 
afraid and distrustful over the government’s management of their personal finances had also 
answered that they were more interested in supporting their proximate social circle:  
For unit trust, which started in 2008, I was more influenced by a friend 
who became a unit trust agent. I saw that they had just started becoming 
an agent, so I wanted to support them. I compared keeping my money in 
a simple savings account, or in government unit trust schemes. Private 
unit trusts in comparison had a much better performance. So, I thought 
why not support his business and at the same time earn some income. 
(Citizen Investor #9, 29 September 2016, translated from Malay) 
 To conclude this section, our findings demonstrate that citizen investors’ roles in FC 
development are influenced by the (lack of) trust in elite-citizen relations. In a context of 
growing political hostility, citizen investors disregard anything that has to do with elites they 
distrust, choosing instead to look inwards and across their networks. Notwithstanding 
citizens’ personal feelings towards the elites responsible for this programme and more 
importantly, in search for their personal financial security, citizen investors are changing their 
attitudes towards financial planning through stock market products. This has subsequently 




In this complex relationship that citizen investors have with formal policies, it is also 
apparent that they take for granted the privilege they have (through their incomes and social 
circles) to be able to participate in FC development which is not open to many other 
Malaysian citizens. In doing so, this sustains the illusion of equality in FC discourse. When 
asked if they considered stock market investment to be an exclusive activity, citizens’ 
answers were often similar to the formal language used to defend FC: that participation in the 
stock market is a right rather than a privilege that should and could be democratically enjoyed 
across society.  
 
5. Conclusion – Going Beyond Financial Citizenship  
This article provides a critical case study that observes financialization through the lens of 
postcolonial FC development specific to the Malaysian experience. In doing so, we were able 
to respond to calls for studies of postcolonial economic geography (Pollard et al., 2009) and 
non-Anglo-American financialization (Christophers, 2012) and demonstrate not only that 
economic and financial practices are far from being homogenous or universal, they are also 
driven by spatial and historical differences.  
Our study contributes to the wider literature on FC and financialization by 
demonstrating the value of a nuanced analysis of elite-citizen relations which reflects the 
specific history and politics of a nation, which sometimes pre-dates the financialization story 
as understood from existing Euro-American studies. The paper highlights in a much more 
general way that FC development can be understood as a politically-inflected programme by 
elites to garner political legitimacy. However, the paper also demonstrates that using a 
postcolonial approach in observing FC helps us to understand more specifically the roles that 
both elites and citizens play in FC and more broadly, financialization. In Malaysia’s case, FC 




that has helped influenced the particular roles that elites have constructed for themselves in 
shaping nation building that affects citizens and in turn, their actions that then influence FC 
and the way it is developed and understood today.  
The case of Malaysia problematises the notion of FC, as the country’s specific 
historical development has made the discourse more complex than the “simple binary coding 
of membership” in FC (Kear 2013, 936). Here, FC was not simply, as Kear puts it, an “ethical 
claim to hypothetical rights guaranteed by no one,” (Kear, 2014, 107), it has also been an 
important and visible element of postcolonial nation building for political legitimacy, which, 
since the 1970s, has encouraged redistribution of wealth through the implementation of 
management funds. At the same time, the Malaysian case is far from being an example of an 
inclusive financial system in development as envisioned by FC proponents. In particular, its 
potential is obstructed by the ongoing inability of many Malaysian citizens to participate in 
even the most basic of financial activities, let alone complex ones such as stock market 
investment (Former Malaysian finance minister, #13, 5 April 2016). 
When those who require rights (citizens) exercise their rights, it affects not only the 
environment in which they live in, but also the future of those who grant these rights (elites) 
(Marshall, 1950). Similarly, the nation building goal of Malaysian FC development means 
that when financial citizens exercise their “rights to finance” (by acting in the manner 
expected of them, such as actively investing in the stock market and planning for their 
financial futures), they impact the aspirations of political and financial elites (in this case, 
nation building and political legitimacy). In doing so citizens are responsibilised as 
fundamental contributors to the sustainability and growth of the nation as well as for their 
own personal development. Through their actions, financialised citizens play an active role in 
the reinforcement of FC and the exacerbation of its exclusionary effects. Citizen investors 




to protect their personal financial security in the face of political uncertainty, rather than to 
benefit the country. Nevertheless, in taking the initiative to become more financially 
autonomous, and doing so by consuming stock market products, they are already becoming 
the type of financialised citizens that Malaysian elites say they want.  
 
Note 
Since 2018, the Malaysian polity has changed dramatically with the re-election of Dr. 
Mahathir as Prime Minister, replacing Najib Razak. These political changes raise the question 
of whether FC will continue to be used as part of nation building, especially since citizens 
have been mobilised in a crowdfunding donation effort to assist in paying down the 
government’s debt of RM 1 trillion left by the Najib Razak Administration. The 
crowdfunding platform, called Tabung Harapan (Hope Fund) launched on 30 May 2018 
collected more than RM200 million (approximately $67 million) from Malaysian citizens by 
the time it closed in early 2019 (The Straits Times, 2019).  
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